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STANDARDS, RULES, AND SOCIAL NORMS
ERICA. POSNER*
I want to discuss three things: the economic literature on rules
and standards, the economic approach to social norms, and the
rule of law. The connection between these topics might be hard
to see. The economic literature on rules and standards deals
with the optimal form of the law, whereas the economic
literature on social norms deals with nonlegal phenomena and
the rule of law as a political ideal But I will argue that the three
topics are closely related, and that analysis of them together
illuminates each.
I. RuLEs AND STANDARDS
My exposition of the economic analysis of rules and standards
relies heavily on a model used by Professor Kaplow.1 For the sake
of brevity, I will skip a number of important details, including
the role of precedent; the interested reader should consult the
original.
When the legislature enacts a rule, it specifies in advance of
some action whether that action will be penalized. When the
legislature enacts a standard, it delegates to a court the authority
to determine after the action whether that action will be
penalized. Rules state that you may not do A, B, and C; a
standard typically says that you may not behave "unreasonably,"
or "negligently," or "unconscionably," leaving itto the courts to
determine whether an action meets these criteria.2
Suppose a legislature contemplates regulating some action X.
It does not know whether the action will cause harm but does
know the probability that it will cause harm. Should it use a rule
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. My thanks to Eric Rasmusen
andJonathan Wiener for helpful discussions.
1. See Louis Kaplow, Rules VemsusStandards:AnEconomicAnalysis, 42 DUKE LJ. 557, 624-
29 (1992); see also citations therein.
2. As 1aplow points out, the rule-standard issue should not be confused with the
optimal complexity of a rule or standard. See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal
Complexity ofLegalRules, 11J. L ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995).
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or a standard? The simplest case assumes that affected parties do
not inform themselves about the law, whether the law is a rule or
a standard. The legislature must determine two quantities. The
first quantity is its one-time cost of promulgating a rule. The
second quantity is computed by multiplying the cost of judicial
enforcement by the expected number of accidents (which is
itself a function of the number of affected parties and the care
they take given the cost of the precautions available to them,
their uninformed prediction of the chance of accident, and the
expected harm that would result from the accident). If the first
quantity exceeds the second, the legislature should enact a
standard. The reason is that when few accidents are likely to
occur, and the judiciary is efficient enough at evaluating them,
the legislature should not bother incurring the costs of engaging
in the necessary research into the possible harmful
consequences of the action.
If the legislature believes that affected parties will invest in
legal advice in advance of their conduct, regardless of whether
the law is a rule or a standard, its calculation should change.
Initially, to know whether the parties will invest in legal advice,
the legislature must know the price of legal advice, and also the
difference, for each person, between his total expected costs if
informed and his total expected costs if uninformed. To
determine the former, the legislature must perform the person's
cost-minimization calculations, and this involves estimating the
marginal value of increased precautions in reducing the
probability of harm, a calculation that requires the person (in
the model) to know or (more likely) to estimate the level of
harm. Having determined that regulated parties will inform
themselves of the law, the legislature must now compare the cost
of promulgating a rule with the sum of (1) the total amount of
legal costs incurred by all regulated parties, and (2) the cost of
all the enforcement proceedings that result when informed
parties take their optimal precautions.
The legislature might also believe that affected parties will
invest in legal advice in advance of their conduct if the law is a
rule but not if the law is a standard. This belief assumes that a
person can more cheaply inform himself of a rule than inform
himself of a standard, a plausible assumption given that the
person (or his lawyer) merely consults the legislative code in
order to determine the content of a rule, whereas he would have
[Vol. 21
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to study and interpret a body of case law in order to predict how
a court would apply a standard. To determine whether to use a
rule or a standard, the legislature must take account not only of
promulgation and enforcement costs, but also of efficiency gains
that result because a rule enables parties to take more efficient
precautions than a standard does, precautions that result in an
accident rate different from the rate that would exist under a
standard.
Finally, if, as is plausible, some people will not inform
themselves of rules or standards, some people will inform
themselves of rules but not of standards, and some people will
inform themselves of both rules and standards, the choice
between rule and standard will depend on the fractions of the
population that will invest in each level of information, and on
the relative gains enjoyed by each population under each
regime.
This brief summary does not do justice to Kaplow's argument,
but it suffices to illustrate the tremendous amounts of
information that even a simple economic analysis requires.
Indeed, we have only talked about the question of whether the
legislature should choose to use a rule or a standard. Having
exhausted itself in making this determination, it still must
choose, among other things, the optimal complexity of the rule
or standard, not to mention (if a rule) the normative content of
the law!
The claim that economic analysis requires superhuman
information-processing capabilities is an old and hackneyed
criticism of law and economics. One of the economist's
responses, one with which I agree, is that models usefully draw
our attention to variables that should be taken into account even
if they cannot always be taken into account with precision. A
slightly more aggressive version of this defense holds that people
can actually apply the model to the world by supplying the
values for the parameters from guesses based on their rough
intuitions.
This response is valid sometimes but not always. The model of
rules and standards may be one of those cases in which the
response fails. To see why, observe that ideally we want to
economize on the total cost of the legal system, including the
3. SeeKaplow, supra note 2 (regarding complexity).
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creation and enforcement of laws. Call this amount C. Now C is
clearly a function of the efficiency of a particular law. If a speed
limit of 55 m.p.h. is more efficient than a speed limit of 65
m.p.h., for example, then a legislature that chooses to enact the
first speed limit minimizes C relative to the choice of the second
speed limit. But suppose it is more costly for a legislature to fill
in the content of the speed limit than it is for the courts to apply
a speed limit standard-for example, requiring people to drive
at "reasonable" speeds. Then to minimize , we want the courts
to do the work, not the legislatures. C, then, is a function both of
the content of the law and of the process by which it is created
(rule or standard). This is where Professor Kaplow's analysis
stops. But we can go further. Suppose it is cheaper for the
legislature to determine the process by which a law is created in
a particular case by using rough, intuitive guesses of the value of
the variables in Professor Kaplow's model rather than by
sponsoring hearings and studies for the purpose of obtaining
more precise estimates. Then to minimize C, we want the
legislature to use the rough guess method. C is therefore a
function of the content of the law, the process by which it is
created, and the method used to determine which process to use
to create the law. But how should the legislature know whether
to rely on rough, intuitive guesses rather than sponsor hearings
and studies for the purpose of obtaining more precise estimates?
Maybe, it should mimic what it did last time it faced a question
like the one under consideration, or maybe it should sponsor a
study to determine the most efficient method for determining
the method used to determine which process to use to create
the law. You should get the point by now: there is an infinite
regress.
Or to put this another -way, notice all of the quantities that the
legislature must estimate in order to determine whether to use a
rule or a standard: the cost of promulgating a rule, the cost of
enforcing a standard, the probability of accident given that
people are informed of the law, the probability of accident given
that they are uninformed, the expected harm they would suffer
in an accident, the cost of legal advice, and so on. Where do the
numbers come from? How does the legislature make "rough
guesses" about these quantities?
One possible answer to these questions is that the legislature
obtains these numbers by holding hearings and funding studies.
[Vol. 21
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But what does the legislature learn from these hearings and
studies? If "hearings and studies" are defined broadly as activities
that supply the legislature with all relevant numbers, then when
it engages in "hearings and studies" in order to determine
whether to use a rule or a standard, it thereby also learns the
numbers necessary to choose the optimal content of the law-in
which case the legislature should go ahead and issue a rule
rather than force a court to duplicate this information
gathering. Thus, if "hearings and studies" are defined broadly,
legislatures would never issue standards.
If "hearings and studies" are defined narrowly as activities that
supply the legislature with just those numbers that are necessary
for performing calculations at a particular stage of analysis, for
example, the rules-versus-standards stage of analysis, then the
infinite regress returns. If hearings and studies would tell the
legislature only that, say, a rule would be superior to a standard,
the legislature must still (before knowing this) hold hearings
and commission studies to determine whether hearings and
studies are appropriate, rather than imitation or whatever, ad
infinitum.
A second possible answer to the question how legislatures
make rough guesses is that they bring with them prior
knowledge about the world, and they use this knowledge to
estimate the quantities needed to do the rules-standards
calculation. But why should we think that they have the right
kind of knowledge to make the choice between rules and
standards, but not the right kind of knowledge to determine the
optimal content of the law rather than deferring to the courts? If
this is the case, the rules-standards analysis is irrelevant. And if
we do not, then we plunge back into the regress. This time, to be
sure, the regress is not necessarily infinite-at some earlier stage
the legislatures might have sufficient prior knowledge about the
world-but we still do not know what stage that is.
The infinite regress does not arise from any flaw in Professor
Kaplow's reasoning, but is a characteristic of the optimizing
methodology of economics. It is described as follows:
Suppose that we first formulate a decision problem as a
conventional optimization based on the assumption of
unbounded rationality and thus on the assumption of zero
deliberation cost. Suppose we then recognize that
deliberation cost is positive; so we fold this further cost into
No. 1] 105
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the original problem. The difficulty is that the augmented
optimization problem ill itself be costly to analyze; and this
new deliberation cost will be neglected. We can then
formulate a third problem, and so on. We quickly 4find
ourselves in an infinite and seemingly intractable regress.
This objection has been recognized for a long time, and there
is no reason to consider it a decisive blow against economics or
law and economics. One should recognize, however, that the
problem looms larger in some contexts than in others. It does
not seem to be a problem when one tries to determine the
relative advantages of different remedies for breach of contract
and other questions of substantive law. But the problem
becomes hard to ignore in discussions about how laws allow
legislatures, courts, and other agencies to economize on their
lawmaking costs. If a law seems justified because it allows a
lawmaking body to economize on its resources, a claim that the
lawmaking body chose that law for that purpose by engaging in
an optimizing methodology is caught in the snares of the
infinite regress.
These objections are not merely theoretical. When one turns
from theory to the practices of legislatures or courts, one sees
very little of what Professor Kaplow models. This is particularly
true of courts. When courts interpret precedents, they face the
question whether to treat them as standards or rules. Professor
Kaplow's model implies that courts should consider the cost of
promulgation, the future cost of enforcement, the legal costs of
affected parties, and so on, but courts do not do this or even act
"as if" they did this. Instead, courts engage in a kind of practical
reasoning. If earlier cases use similar reasoning and come to
similar holdings with respect to a recurrent set of facts, a court
may derive a rule from them; if earlier cases are inconsistent or
sparse or difficult to understand, a court may assert a standard
(effectively saying that future courts must determine the rule).
Professor Kaplow's model also does not describe legislative
behavior. Legislatures like courts generally imitate what came
before them: the common law or customary law, which is
codified, or earlier statutes, which themselves are based on still
earlier statutes, some of them taken from foreign countries,
most of which are derived ultimately from the common law or
4. John Conlisk, Why BoundedRationaly?, 34J. EcoN. Lrr. 669, 687 (1996).
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customary law One might argue that in all these cases the
decision-maker is optimizing in the face of its high promulgation
costs, but this response makes the rules-standards analysis trivial.
The theoretical objection raised by the infinite regress and
the empirical dependence of lawmaking on imitation imply that
a proper analysis of rules and standards must approach the
subject from a different angle. I will suggest an approach in Part
m, after what might seem to be a digression on social norms in
Part II. But the connection between the two topics will presently
be clear.
II. SOCIALNORMS
In economic models in which rational actors take others'
actions as given, individuals cannot cooperate for the purpose of
creating collective goods. Everyone would cheat on the
cooperative project, because each person does better by
cheating if the others cooperate (he then obtains part of the
surplus without contributing to it) and each does better by
cheating if the others cheat (he avoids incurring the costs of
contributing to a surplus that would not be created). Yet people
often engage in cooperative activities, including the production
of the various standard public goods, in the absence of legal
enforcement, sometimes even in the face of legal penalties.
Examples include the merchants who resolve disputes among
themselves without resorting to the courts; the cattle ranchers
who help each other maintain fences; and the diamond dealers
who refuse to do business with those who have engaged in bad
6business practices. One explanation of these phenomena is that
"social norms" deter the undesirable conduct, but this
explanation is not satisfactory. One wants to know why social
norms deter the undesirable conduct, which means
5. For a survey of evolutionary theories of the law, see E. Donald Elliott, Te
Evolutionaiy Tradition in Juripdenre, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985); see also William
Ewald, ComparaltveJurispmdenne (HI): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AMJ. COMP. L. 489
(1995) (discussing Alan Watson's theory of legal transplants).
6. See ROBERTC. ELuCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out
of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Indushy, 21J. LEGAL STUD.
115 (1992); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relatwi in Business.:A Preliminamy Study, 28
AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); see generally Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence
of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on CollectiveAction, 63 U. CHt. L REV. 133 (1996).
No. 1] 107
HeinOnline  -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 107 1997-1998
HamardJournal ofLaw & Public Policy
understanding how they come into existence in the first place.
Why do people create and enforce social norms?7
There have been numerous attempts to answer this question,
none of them wholly satisfactory but many of them illuminating
and useful. I focus on two of them.
The first model uses the theories of repeat games and
signaling. It begins by noting that people who cooperate often
(usually?) do so over a long period of time during which each
can observe the actions of others and decide on the basis of
those actions whether to continue cooperating or stop. When
each round of play is followed by another, players know that if
they cheat in one round they may have no chance of obtaining
high payoffs in the next. Some level of cooperation, and a
concomitant production of some level of the potential surplus,
can be sustained by various strategies, most famously, the "tit-for-
tat" strategy in which a player cooperates in every round except
those that succeed a round in which the other players cheated."
Although the results have to be interpreted with care because of
the problem of multiple equilibria-and this is true especially
when information is imperfect and the number of players is
greater than two-the results are nonetheless highly suggestive
of the possibility of nonlegal cooperation.
Although this theory takes great strides toward explaining how
people can cooperate in the production of collective goods, it
does not explain what a social norm is. In the diamond trade,
for example, merchants no doubt refrain from misrepresenting
the value of a diamond because if they were discovered, other
merchants would stop doing business with them, but the repeat
game theory does not explain why the merchants seal their
contracts using traditional words and record their contracts in a
traditional and consistent way.9 These practices are norms. One
might argue that these practices are the cheapest way to make a
record, but this argument is implausible, because it does not
explain why every transaction takes the same form. Surely, when
7. This question has drawn the attention of economists and legal economists. See Eric
A. Posner, Signals, Symbols, and Sodal Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming 1998), for one effort and for citations to both literatures. The interest
among legal economists can be traced to ELLIcgSON, supra note 6.
8. The literature on this topic is vast; the interested reader should consult standard
game theory texts for discussion and dtadons. Se; ag., ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMIES AND
INFORMATION (2d ed. 1994).
9. SeeBernstein, supra note 6, at 122.
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traders know each other better or worse, or the value of the
transaction is higher or lower, the optimal form of the writing
would change as well. What needs to be explained is why that
does not happen.
This is where the idea of signaling comes in. Suppose that in a
merchant community some people are better contractual
partners than others. This may occur for several reasons: the
"high" types care more about future payoffs, or they feel guilty
easily, or they cannot hide their intentions well, and so on. The
"low" types are the opposite. When seeking partners in
contractual endeavors, high types want to match up with other
high types, but low types want to match up with high types. Low
types hit upon the strategy of sending "signals" that they think
high types will think that only other high types can send. But
because a high type who accepts a low type as a contractual
partner risks being cheated, high types will send their own
signals. They might mimic the signals of the low types in order
to avoid the impression of being low themselves, or they might
send even more costly signals than the low types do. Depending
on the cost structures of the various signals, it is possible to
obtain equilibria in which only the high types send the signal, or
equilibria in which everyone sends a signal. (Other possibilities
exist as well.) The latter equilibria are not informative, and do
no one any good, but they can be sustained because no one
wants to deviate from the equilibrium signal lest as a
consequence others believe that he is a low type.
There are many examples of such signaling in everyday life, of
which gift-giving is probably the most intuitive. People give gifts
to each other in order to show that they care about maintaining
relationships: low types find it hard to give gifts, or good gifts,
because they are costly and they require a costly inquiry into the
other person's tastes. 0 In the example of the diamond
community, the peculiar use of the writing may have begun as a
signal of one's type. A low type may have introduced the writing
as a way of persuading the other person that he was a high type.
After all, the writing is costly in the sense that the existence of a
record makes it more difficult to cheat one's partner by
misrepresenting the transaction to arbitrators or witnesses in
10. See Eric A. Posner, Allndm Status, and Tust in the Law of Gfls and Gratuitous
mmises, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 567 (1997).
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case of a dispute. The high types, who may have been happy
enough with oral transactions, would hasten to mimic the low
types, so that their partners would not think that they are the low
types. Social norms, then, reflect signaling behavior unlike
efficient behavior in transactions, which one can expect to vary
according to the type of transaction, signaling behavior is always
patterned, norm-like.
The second theory focuses on coordination games, rather
than on prisoners' dilemmas. In a coordination game, both
players do better if they engage in a similar or symmetrical
action than if they do not. An old example draws on the
problem of two people driving towards each other on roads
without lanes. If both people drive on the right or both people
drfie on the left, they receive high payoffs. If one person drives
on the right while the other drives on the left, they crash. It can
be shown that if people generally imitate people with higher
payoffs (those who do not crash), and if enough people start off
choosing the same strategy, over time one strategy will drive out
the other and result in an equilibrium that is stable aast
occasional mistakes or experiments With novel strategies. The
equilibrium strategy, for example driving on the right, can be
called a social norm. What is striking about this result, and what
distinguishes it from the earlier model, is that it holds even if
people are strangers who are not self-consciously involved in a
cooperative endeavor.
In the case of the merchant group, the form of writing could
have been a convention in this sense. If some people started
using writings at random or as an experiment or as the result of
a misunderstanding, and it turned out that they were later
involved in fewer disputes, others might have started imitating
the first. Notice that the use of the writing may be value-
maximizing, but it survives as a result of a kind of natural
selection, not because of rational optimization. But this means
that people may continue to imitate both the use of a writing
and the particular form of the writing long after it ceases to be
value-maximizing.
11. SeePosner, supranote 7 (regarding symbols).
12. SeROBERTSUGDEN, TVE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION, AND WELFARE 34
(1986).
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These models do not explain all forms of collective action;
indeed, they raise as many problems as they solve. But they
appear to have fruitful implications, which I will discuss below.
Also, notice that the first model relies on the standard
optimizing methodology of economics, whereas the second
assumes that people mimic rather than optimize-or, to use the
trendy phrase, it assumes that people are "boundedly rational."
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Positive Implications
It is difficult to interpret Professor Kaplow's model as a
positive model, because it puts too heavy an epistemic burden
on legislatures and courts, and because the evidence suggests
that legislatures and courts do not typically weigh costs and
benefits when choosing between rules and standards. The
signaling model and the evolutionary model offer some
alternatives.
To illustrate the application of the signaling model, assume
that legislators, like our merchants and cattle ranchers, have an
interest in signaling that they are high types. Space limitations
prevent me from defending the assumption, but something like
it can be found in various models of the political process. If this
is so, time-consuming and expensive legislative studies emerge as
signals in equilibrium. The reason is that if people cannot
directly observe the quality of laws, and therefore cannot vote
for legislators on the basis of the quality of the legislative
product, they might infer the type of a legislator from the
energy that he puts into legislation. A legislator might then
overinvest in legislation, which could take the form of
supporting rules over standards, because by hypothesis standards
cost the legislature little. (Legislators might also overinvest by
supporting lots of different laws.) They might create standards
only (or usually) when the subject of the law is controversial,
thus requiring courts to absorb the political costs of taking the
wrong position. One might thus expect uncontroversial laws
(traffic regulations, tax codes) to appear as rules and unpopular.
or controversial laws (abortion regulation, affirmative action
programs) to appear as standards.
No. 1] ill
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The first model also suggests that if judges want to have
influence, they can cause other judges to follow them on some
cases if they can commit themselves to following those judges on
other cases. One way to commit oneself, if one otherwise cares
about the content of an opinion, is to follow anotherjudge even
when one does not agree with him or her.'3 If this is true, rules
may emerge in areas of law where disputes are common and not
in areas of law where they are rare, for only in the former will it
be clear enough that a judge is following another judge rather
than contradicting him.
To illustrate the application of the second model, assume that
legislatures mimic other legislatures. They might do so because
the effect of most laws on social behavior is so complex that a
boundedly rational legislator could not predict it. Ironically, it is
possible that the results of Professor Kaplow's model will be
vindicated. For if laws containing optimal rules and standards
are more likely to survive (in the sense that legislatures revise
rules and standards only when they lead to observable
pathologies), then imitation of them will cause them to spread.
However, it is also possible that lags will occur.
Finally, assume that courts are also boundedly rational, and
imitate prior opinions when the facts underlying those opinions
sufficiently resemble the facts of the case before them. When
such imitation occurs, observers (or the court itself) will say that
the precedent states a rule. When a case is novel, and the court
must decide on the basis of the facts, it will appeal to a standard.
So when, in a particular area of law, facts vary considerably from
case to case, that area of law will be more standard-like, whereas
in other areas of the law rules will emerge.
These sketchy examples should not persuade anyone that
Professor Kaplow's analysis is right or wrong. For one thing,
Professor Kaplow's analysis is normative, and these examples are
all of positive analysis. For another, the first model relies on the
same optimizing methodology that I criticized while discussing
Professor KapIow's model. I do think that the infinite regress is
less of a danger in the first model than in Professor Kaplow's
model, mainly because the first model does not ask players to
13. Se- eg., ThomasJ. Miceli and Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation andJudicial Dision-
Making, 23J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31 (1994); Eric Rasmusen, judicial Legitimaq As a
Repeated Game, 10J. L EcoN. & ORG. 63 (1994).
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economize on deliberation costs, but I do not have the space to
defend this argument. The lesson of the discussion is more
modest it is that models that analyze incentives to engage in
cooperative action may be helpful for explaining important
features of the legal system, including the use of rules and
standards.
B. Normative Implications: The Rule of Law
The different models have many normative implications, but I
want to focus on the implications for the rule of law. By the rule
of law I mean an ideal that law should inflict punishment only
on people who engage in actions that conform to general
categories identified by that law, and not on people who engage
in actions or have characteristics that the authorities conclude
are undesirable after the fact. Because the rule of law implies a
preference for identification of proscribed actions in advance, it
implies (as the name suggests) a preference for rules over
standards. 14 Although a legislature, by issuing a standard,
announces in advance of the regulated conduct that anyone who
engages in that conduct now risks a sanction, in practice this
announcement does not amount to much. To announce, for
example, that product liability will henceforth be determined by
the standard of negligence does not tell people what is
permitted and what is not permitted, though it gives them
something of an idea. I do not mean to suggest, however, that
standards are inherently bad: the rule of law is one among many
values, and departure from it on occasions to economize on
lawmaking costs may be justified. Indeed, this is one
interpretation of Professor Kaplow's analysis.
The signaling model suggests deeper problems with
standards, problems that arise because people's behavior may be
more sensitive to standards than to rules. Consider an example
from Professor Lessig, which I will quote at length:
Before the 1960s, motorcyclists in Soviet Russia did not wear
helmets. In part this was because of a lack of any perceived
need to wear helmets; in part it was because the Soviet
economy failed to produce any helmets.... Soon Russians
14. See generally Frederick Schauer, Rues and the Rule of Laws 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 645 (1991).
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began to wear motorcycle helmets produced in Western
Europe....
When these helmets first began to appear, the Soviet
government quickly reacted against them. For despite
bearing the medical costs associated with cycling accidents,
the Soviets perceived a much greater cost to the Soviet state
associated with individuals wearing helmets, that is, the
invasion of Western style. Because helmets were produced
only in the West, wearing them was a political statement
antithetical to the message the Soviet government wanted
broadcast.
Thus began an extraordinary and self-conscious campaign
by the Soviet government to vilify the wearers of motorcycle
helmets. Cartoons appeared in the popular (read:
government-controlled) press.... By the early 1960s, people
began wearing helmets only at night, to avoid easy detection.
The night-riding behavior suggests the campaign attacking
helmet wearing as "imperialism" had some effect. For no laws
were passed banning the wearing of helmets.' 5
When the Soviet Union finally began manufacturing helmets
in its own factories, people began to wear helmets again
(presumably, during the day): the stigma now was not against
wearing any helmet, only against wearing imported helmets."
In the United States, any opinion by the President or other
important officials on the desirability of motorcycle helmets
would be widely ignored if not ridiculed, just as President
Carter's urging that people lower their thermostats was widely
ridiculed. It certainly would not influence the frequency with
which people wear helmets. The United States, in fact, uses laws
to encourage people to wear helmets.
What accounts for this difference? An answer is that in the
Soviet Union having a reputation for loyalty to the state was, in
the eyes of the authorities, far more important than it is in the
United States. In the Soviet Union, a bad reputation could result
in expulsion from the Communist Party, and as a consequence
in denial of education, desirable jobs, and other benefits. In the
United States a bad reputation matters less because the state
does not punish you for having it. To put this in terms of the
15. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulalion of Sodal Meaning 62 U. CH. L REV. 943, 964-65
(1995).
16. See id. at 965.
[Vol. 21
HeinOnline  -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 114 1997-1998
Standards, Rules, and Social Norms
signaling model, it was more important to signal one's loyalty to
the state in the Soviet Union than it ever has been in the United
States. Thus, in the Soviet Union, people would voluntarily
engage in patriotic displays, refrain from criticizing the
government, and even refrain from wearing motorcycle helmets
when doing so was defined as disloyal or unpatriotic. In the
United States this phenomenon is rarer because the
commitment to the rule of law generally restricts the ability of
legislatures to enact vague standards (for example, "you must be
patriotic") that can lead to the pooling behavior that occurred
in the Soviet Union.
The conformity-inducing properties of standards, however, do
not depend on secret police. In the United States, standards
would be enforced by the courts. If people cannot anticipate in
advance which actions conform to the standard and which
actions violate it, they will engage in actions that serve as signals
that they possess the characteristics that they believe courts
would look for. The result would be pooling of the sort thai
occurred in the Soviet Union, though no doubt on a smaller
scale. A commitment to the rule of law, in contrast, forces
legislatures to specify the desired behavior in advance. Because
it is (comparatively) clear what is permitted and what is not
permitted, less pooling can be expected. Or to put it in terms of
the model, when the signal of loyalty or good behavior is too
costly, people will not use it, instead satisfying their
nonreputational preferences. People may abide by rules in a
casuistic manner, sometimes defeating the policy they
implement, but they will overcomply with standards.
Should this bother us? From the perspective of social welfare
in the economist's sense, this question is quite difficult. Pooling
equilibria can be socially costly because everyone incurs costs in
sending signals that do not produce any informational benefits.
But if sending a signal (like wearing a helmet) causes less total
harm than would exist in a separating equilibrium (in which
only some people wear helmets), then the pooling equilibria
would be superior on efficiency grounds. This means that, even
if some regulated behavior will occur rarely and there will be few
enforcements, a standard may be inappropriate, because it may
cause overcompliance.
But from a different perspective-from the perspective of
autonomy-the use of standards is more clearly troubling. When
No. 1]
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people feel that they must signal in order to avoid inferences
that they are low types-unpatriotic or disloyal or careless or
unreasonable-then they will engage in various forms of
patterned behavior rather than satisfying their tastes or pursuing
their goals. The Soviet authorities never had to say that wearing
bicycle helmets is a punishable offense: once it had expressed its
disapproval, people would overreact to avoid the inference of
disloyalty. Vague statements about the undesirability of various
jobs, pursuits, hobbies, social relationships, and views would
likely cause a similar reaction. Indeed, even if the state expresses
no opinion on these issues, but punishes anyone deemed
unpatriotic, people will struggle to act in conformity with
whatever norms they think the state would approve.
When reputation matters a lot, people will conform to
whatever pattern of behavior they believe that everyone else
approves. When reputation matters a lot to the state, with
unpleasant consequences to those who have a bad reputation,
people will conform to whatever pattern of behavior they believe
that the state approves. The state exploits this phenomenon by
announcing standards of behavior (the patriotic citizen, or the
good socialist), rather than announcing rules, for rules give
people the freedom to choose among the actions that are not
specifically prohibited. This is why states in which people have
freedom also have a strong commitment to the rule of law, and
it may be why the rule of law is such a powerful political ideal
that overrides short-term concerns about social welfare.
IV. CONCLUSION
This talk has consisted of a hodgepodge of points, none of
them strongly supported, all of them speculative, so let me
briefly summarize the most important in a manner that does not
exaggerate their strength. First is an uneasiness with the
optimizing method in some (but not all) contexts of legal
decision-making: one may be able to overcome this uneasiness
by embedding the decision in a game in which people
spontaneously cooperate, so that legal decisions are an outcome
of their cooperative behavior; or one may overcome this
uneasiness more directly by modeling bounded rationality. But
though the latter approach is exciting and perhaps theoretically
more pure, it is hampered by the primitive state of the
methodology. Second is the claim that the rule of law is
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important not because rules are better than standards on
efficiency grounds-in fact, Professor Kaplow's analysis plausibly
suggests that sometimes rules are better and sometimes
standards are better. The rule of law is important if we care
about autonomy, because standards, more so than rules,
encourage self-reinforcing conformity to the imagined goals of
the state rather than actions that reflect one's authentic values
and interests.
HeinOnline  -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 117 1997-1998
HeinOnline  -- 21 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 118 1997-1998
